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This paper explores the empirical association between democracy and per capita output 
growth in Pakistan using data for the period 1947 to 2006. The findings of the paper indicate a 
weak negative association between democracy and output growth. Consistent with some 
current empirical literature, democracy is also found to influence output growth indirectly. The 
empirical results are robust to different democracy variables and output growth equation 
specifications. The empirical findings also highlight the role of other variables in determining 
output growth and, except for rising oil prices, show its positive linkage to  physical and 
human capital, government consumption, openness of trade practices and inflation. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has concerned social 
scientists since the seventeenth century. Two main positions still discussed today were 
staked out in the 1650s, one side arguing that democracy endorsed economic growth, 
while the other side arguing that democracy obstructed economic growth.1 Proponents of 
democracy argue that autocracy, even when benign, weakens the rule of law required for 
routine economic activity. According to this view, economic growth requires 
‘developmental democracy’, in which (legal and electoral) limits on arbitrary power 
provide individuals the safety to plan for their economic futures [Sklar (1987)]. 
Democracy promotes rule of law, brings openness in society and provides freedom of 
choice and stable politics, which discourage corruption and extremist policies. In other 
words, democracy provides a check on governmental power and thereby limits the 
potential of public officials to accumulate personal wealth and devise unpopular policies. 
 
Muhammad Zakaria <mzakaria09@yahoo.co> is Assistant Professor at Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics, Islamabad. Bashir Ahmed Fida <bashirfd@yahoo.com> is Assistant Professor at the 
COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad.  
Authors’ Note: Authors are thankful to Zhou Ya Hong and Toe Ji for giving valuable comments on an 
earlier version of this paper.  
1For more details on these positions reader is referred to Kurzman, et al. (2002). 
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Democracy leads to credibility of government policies, as lack of credibility tends to 
weaken stabilisation programmes, delay investment, depress savings, encourage capital 
flight and promote the growth of black market economies. Democracy limits state 
intervention in the economy but is responsive to public demands in areas such as 
education, health and  justice, and thereby encourages stable and long-run growth [Rodrik 
(1999); Baum and Lake (2003)]. Democratic nations are better at managing conflicts, 
avoiding catastrophes and dealing with major public health crises. In short, supporters of 
democracy argue that the motivations of citizens to work and invest, the effective 
allocation of resources in the marketplace, and profit maximising private activity can all 
be maintained in a climate of liberty, free-flowing information and secured control of 
property [North (1990)]. With few exceptions, developed nations are also democratic 
states. 
Opponents of democracy, in both academic and political debates, argue that 
democracy is an inefficient system for developing countries. According to this view, 
economic growth in developing countries requires ‘developmental dictatorship’ in 
which people are required to do hard work and make sacrifices [Gregor (1979)]. It is 
also argued that democracies lend themselves to popular demands for immediate 
consumption at the expense of profitable investments. Further, democracies cannot 
be insulated from the interests of rent-seekers and cannot utilise resources efficiently, 
and that democracies are prone to conflicts due to social, ethnic and class struggles. 
In turn, authoritarianism tends to suppress conflicts, resist sectional interests and take 
coercive measures essential for rapid growth. Many rich countries have become rich 
under authoritarian rule and have often experienced declines in growth after a 
democratic transformation.2 If this conventional wisdom is correct, one might be 
justified in concluding that democracy is a luxury to be enjoyed only by countries 
rich enough to afford it. This, indeed, is a common argument among authoritarian 
leaders in the developing world. 
These two positions have been joined in debate by a third perspective of more 
recent origin, which states that democracy has no significant effect on economic 
growth. This view, called as the ‘no-effect’ position, postulates that economic growth 
is due primarily to economic production inputs. The difference between democratic 
or non-democratic regimes is less important than the existence of pro-growth 
governmental policies. In fact, democracy affects economic growth through various 
channels. Some channels exhibit positive effects of democracy on economic growth 
while others exhibit negative effects. The net effects of democracy on economic 
growth thus remain ambiguous. As a result, studying the effects of democracy on 
economic growth is often deemed a futile endeavour. Yet this issue deserves close 
examination as political liberalisation is often the developed countries’ precondition 
for providing financial assistance to developing countries like Pakistan. Therefore, 
determining democracy’s costs and benefits is critical to formulating policies that 
boost economic development. 
Almost all previous studies on this relationship have focused on cross-country data 
analysis. It is quite possible that in one country, due to its socio-cultural conditions, 
 
2For example, Asian economies such as Taiwan and South Korea achieved democracy only recently 
after decades of high economic growth under authoritarian regimes. 
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democracy enhances its economic growth while in another country it may not. In cross-
section data the positive (negative) effects of democracy on economic growth in one 
country may be cancelled out by negative (positive) effects observed in another country, 
leading to ambiguous conclusions. Further, cross-country data analysis uses period 
average data and ignores the obvious possibility that the democratic level of a country 
changes over time. In addition, the use of a single cumulative or average measure of 
economic growth makes empirical results vulnerable to period effects. This implies that 
cross-country data analysis may yield bias estimates. This study examines the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth in Pakistan using annual times-
series data for the period 1947 to 2006 such that the problems of stationarity, robustness 
of specification, as well as the problems related to collinearity, endogeneity and non-
linearity of the model are also addressed.3  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review. Section 3 provides a brief history of democracy and economic growth in 
Pakistan. Section 4 develops the central theoretical argument of this study and outlines its 
methodology. Section 5 presents empirical results. The final section relates the  
conclusions.     
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Post-1960 empirical literature on democracy and development mainly 
focused on the democracy-growth relationship but has failed to arrive at a clear 
conclusion. Of the 13 studies surveyed by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), three found a 
negative effect of democracy on economic growth, four found this negative effect 
in some situations, and six found no relationship whatsoever. In their review of 21 
statistical findings, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) stipulate that eight found in 
favour of democracy, eight in favour of authoritarianism and five discovered no 
difference. Of the 17 papers reviewed in Brunetti (1997), nine found no effect of 
democracy on economic growth, four found positive effects and the other four 
found negative effects. Kurzman, et al. (2002) reviewed 47 quantitative studies, in 
which 19 found a positive relationship between democracy and growth, six found a 
negative relationship, and 10 reported no statistically significant relationship. 
Seven studies found a combination of positive and non-significant results, two 
found a combination of negative and non-significant results, two found mixed 
positive and negative results, and one [Barro (1996)] reported an inverted-U 
effect.4 More recently, Mobarak (2005) finds that higher level of democracy 
promotes growth because democracy reduces volatility which in turn enhances 
growth. Gerring, et al. (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) have also shown 
that democracy promotes growth.5  
 
3Earlier studies of time-series include Cohen (1985), Sloan and Tedin (1987), McMillan, et al. (1993), 
and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). 
4Barro (1996) suggests a nonlinear relationship between democracy and economic growth in which 
democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of 
freedom has already been obtained. 
5Authors are unable to find any time-series study conducted for Pakistan regarding democracy-
development relationship.  
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This literature taken as a whole is fairly inconclusive.6 Roughly, the same number 
of studies stand on both sides of the argument, for and against democracy as an economic 
growth factor. There are various reasons for this inconsistency. The first is inconsistent 
econometric modelling assumptions, since the models used by different studies do vary 
widely. The second is sample and data selection bias. The third is the difference in 
estimation techniques. The fourth is that some studies examine the direct effect of 
democracy on economic growth while others argue that explicit specification of the 
channels of influence will allow a better understanding of the economic costs and 
benefits of democracy [Alesina, et al. (1996); Tavares and Wacziarg (2001); Baum and 
Lake (2003)]. In other words, the ambiguity of theoretical relationship between 
democracy and growth is another source of inconsistency in empirical results. The fifth is 
the construction of democracy index, since some studies used a dichotomous variable to 
measure democracy while others used some objective indices to measure democracy. 
Thus, the issue is complicated by estimates that differ due to data sources, estimation 
techniques, sample compositions and time periods. However, this does not imply that 
there is no relationship between democracy and economic growth. The conditional 
distribution of growth rate as a function of democracy indices might differ from the 
unconditional distribution, even when the conditional mean is the same [Almeida and 
Ferreira (2002)].  
 
3.  HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PAKISTAN 
 
3.1.  Democracy7 
Pakistan came into existence as a Muslim majority state under the Government of 
India Act of 1935, which made it a parliamentary democracy. All successive constitutions of 
Pakistan maintained this notion of parliamentary democracy for Pakistan. However, Pakistan 
has been under military governance for the majority of its 59 years of existence (1947-2006). 
In 1958, the army stepped in for the first time to take over political power. The  second time 
was in 1977, and in 1999 for the third time. The nation’s five elected governments were 
established in 1972, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. But these elected governments were 
removed by the army. As a result, democracy did not work satisfactorily in Pakistan and even 
it could not perform its basic tasks such as providing law and order, making economic 
development and building adequate political institutions. The reasons for democracy’s failure 
in Pakistan is attributed to: 
• Lack of Political Institutions: Political institutions and political parties are 
an important element of parliamentary democracy. In Pakistan political 
parties are private enterprises of single persons or families lacking inner 
democratic structure which prevents them from putting the country on a 
democratic path.  
 
6The inconclusive relationship between democracy and economic growth led researchers to explore 
also other aspects of politics and growth. For instance, Minier (1998) finds that changes in democracy, rather 
than the level of democracy, matter.  
7While writing this sub-section help is taken from, among others, Belton (2004), Haqqani (2006) and 
Robotka (2006). 
Democratic Institutions and Variability of Economic Growth 
 
273
• Lack of Sense of Responsibility: The elected representatives are by and large not 
aware of their rights and responsibilities and no effective system has been  
evolved to train them to function as elected legislators. 
• Lack of Accountability: There has been no public initiative to monitor the 
performance of the elected representatives and elected bodies and to hold them 
accountable on the basis of their track record.  
• Emergence of Democratic Leadership disrupted by Military Rule: During the 
periods of military rule, the political process, which on its own momentum 
develops new leadership in the country, remained halted. Whenever democracy 
was restored, the process did not continue for long enough to allow new 
leadership to emerge.  
• Strategic Factors: The Kashmir war and the (real or perceived) Indian military 
threat for Pakistan were two powerful factors which made the civilian 
governments concede preeminence to the army and priority to its needs. This 
foothold of the military in Pakistani politics has made it a full-fledged player in 
the country’s governance. 
• Insulation of Educated Middle Classes from Politics: Pakistan has always been 
dominated by a small class of  the feudal élite. The educated classes mostly from 
the middle class have remained largely uninvolved in national politics. They 
have  either been sidelined or have got disillusioned seeing no role or prospects 
for them in the political process. As a result, political activity has remained 
largely confined to the moneyed class..  
• International Factors: Foreign vested interests have found it more convenient to 
deal with a military government in Pakistan than with a weak political one. This 
has also discourged the democratisation process in Pakistan. 
• Socio-economic Structure: Due to widespread illiteracy and poverty the socio-
economic structure of Pakistan has been such that people have had to vote the 
feudal élite or industrialists into power.  
The upshot is that the basic conditions that a functional democracy requires are 
missing or are insufficient in Pakistan. This flaw or weakness has provided the excuse to 
the army to step in when political governments have failed to deal with a crisis situation. 
 
3.2.  Economic Growth 
Pakistan’s growth performance throughout its history has remained substandard. 
Growth trends have fluctuated from period to period as the country lurched from 
democratic system to dictatorship as Figure 1 shows. Average growth rate from 1947 to 
1957 was 3.3 percent, from 1958 to 1971 it was 5.6 percent, from 1972 to 1976 it was 5 
percent, from 1977 to 1987 it was 6.5 percent, from 1988 to 1998 it was 4.4 percent, and 
from 1999 to 2006 it was 5.6 percent. It indicates that the average growth rate of GDP 
remained slightly lower during democratic periods than during dictatorship periods. One 
reason is that Pakistan experienced high political instability during democratic periods, 
which adversely affected output growth. In turn, due to high political stability during 
dictatorship periods, GDP experienced a high level of growth. However, as the linear 
GDP growth rate/trend line shows, Pakistan’s GDP growth rate kept on increasing 
throughout the period. 
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Fig. 1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rates (1947–2006) 
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4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1.  Theoretical Arguments 
In theoretical debates, three schools of thought have worked on the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth, namely the conflict school, 
the compatibility school and the skeptical school [Feng (1997)].8 Hobbes (1651) is 
known to have first evolved the conflict view.9 To Hobbes, authoritarian regimes 
were more likely to improve public welfare simply because they could not promote 
their own interests otherwise. Huntington (1968) argues that democracies have weak 
and fragile political institutions and lend themselves to popular demands at the 
expense of profitable investments. According to Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982) 
democratic governments are vulnerable to demands for redistribution to lower-
income groups, and are surrounded by rent-seekers for directly unproductive profit-
seeking activities. Persson and Tabellini (1992) suggest that democracies attempt to 
reduce material inequality through growth deterring redistributive taxation. Lipset 
(1959) proposes that some level of development is required for democracy to 
function properly. This view became popular after the growth success stories in 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
 
8For more details on the theoretical debates liking democracy and growth, interested readers are 
referred to Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), De Haan and Siermann (1995), Nelson 
and Singh (1998), Durham (1999), Gasiorowski (2000), Quinn and Woolley (2001), Kurzman, et al. (2002) and 
Baum and Lake (2003). 
9Cited in Kurzman,  et al. (2002) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006). 
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Authoritarian systems are supposed to implement coercively the hard economic 
policies necessary for growth, and suppress the growth-retarding demands of low-
income earners and labour in general, as well as social instabilities due to ethnic, 
religious, and class struggles, which democracies cannot suppress. Rao (1984) 
observes that absolutist regimes increase economic growth by sacrificing current 
consumption for investment, which makes them rather effective at mobilising 
savings. For economic progress, markets should come first, and authoritarian systems 
can easily facilitate such policies. The argument rests on several assumptions, the 
main one of which is that if given power, authoritarian regimes would behave in a 
growth-friendly manner.10 In fact, the conflict view implies that political democracy 
is a luxury that developing countries cannot afford.  
The compatibility school objects to the arguments made by the conflict school 
and stresses that rulers are potential looters [Harrington (1656)]11 and democratic 
institutions can act to constrain them [North (1990)]. Implementation of the rule of 
law, contract enforcement and protection of property rights do not necessarily imply 
an authoritarian regime. The latter has a tendency to confiscate assets if it can expect 
a brief tenure [Olson (1993)]. Even in the long-run authoritarian regimes lead to a 
corrupt and extravagant use of resources, internally inconsistent policies, and short-
lived and volatile economic progress [Sah (1991); Bhagwati (1995)]. The motivation 
of citizens to work and invest, the effective allocation of resources in the 
marketplace, and profit maximising private activity can only be maintained in a 
democratic system, which leads to higher political rights and civil liberties. 
Democracy exhibits peaceful and predictable transfers of political power and results 
in political stability, which is likely to foster investment and growth by reducing the 
degree of uncertainty [Barro (1991); Alesina, et al. (1996)]. Further, democracies 
rarely engage in military conflict with each other, and this promotes world peace and 
economic growth. Proponents of democracy also propose that if not direct, 
democracy has indirect effects on economic growth [Alesina, et al. (1996); Tavares 
and Wacziarg (2001); Kurzman, et al. (2002); Baum and Lake (2003); Gerring, et al. 
(2005)]. Thus, on the question of democracy-growth relationship, one should 
remember the broader associations that encompass the channels, or the indirect 
effects, between democracy and growth rather than one-to-one causation from regime 
to growth.  
Finally, according to the skeptical perspective, there is no systematic relationship 
between democracy and economic growth. The proponents of this view argue that it is 
the institutional structure and organisations, rather than regimes per se, that matter for 
growth. Pro-growth governmental policies can be implemented in either system. A good 
leadership that can resolve collective problems and be responsive to rapidly changing 
technical and market conditions is more critical to economic growth than a political 
system [Bardhan (1993)].  
Another school of thought, which contains the properties of both conflict and 
compatible schools, suggests a nonlinear effect of democracy on economic growth 
 
10However, several contrasting cases are provided where dictators pursued their own welfare, and failed 
apparently in Africa and the socialist world [De Haan and Siermann (1995); Alesina, et al. (1996)]. 
11See footnote 6.   
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[e.g. see Barro (1996)].  It suggests that growth will initially increase with 
democracy, but the relation will turn out to be negative once a moderate level of 
democracy is attained. One way to interpret this result is that in the worst 
dictatorships an increase in democracy tends to stimulate growth because the 
benefit from limitations on governmental power is the key matter. But in places 
that have already achieved a moderate amount of democracy, a further increase 
hinders growth because the dominant effect comes from the intensified concern 
with social programmes that redistribute resources. Thus, like empirical literature, 
theoretical literature is also highly divided on the effects of democracy on 
economic growth. However, in contrast to empirical literature, the theoretical 
literature is rich enough with micro and macro level explanations linking 
democracy to economic growth. 
 
4.2.  Empirical Estimation   
This section examines democracy-growth linkages using regression analysis. The 
approach followed here is to add the democracy variable to the right-hand-side variables 
of a standard growth equation as an explanatory variable. Here the proposition is that 
democracy is likely to significantly affect output growth. The specification of output 
growth equation is similar to those specifications commonly used in the growth literature 
[see e.g. Barro (1991); Kormendi and Meguire (1985); Levine and Renelt (1992); 
Mankiw, et al. (1992)]. The following dynamic growth equation, which outlines the basic 
thrust of output growth model, will be estimated,12  
ttttt
tttt
oilINFopeng
hckDMCY
µ+γ+γ+γ+γ+
γ+γ+γ+γ=
8765
4321
  
where the lowercase letters denote that the underlying variables are in natural log form. 
The various variables are defined as follows. 
 Yt = Per capita output growth rate 
 DMCt = Democracy index 
 kt = Capital stock per worker 
 hct = Human capital 
 gt = Government consumption 
 opent = Trade openness 
 INFt = Inflation rate  
 oilt = Oil prices   
 µt = White-noise error term 
where γ’s are the parameters to be estimated, and µt is the stochastic disturbance term 
such that µt ~ N(0, σ2).  
 
12Iqbal and Zahid (1998) have also used such type of growth model for Pakistan. Also see, among 
others, Khan (2005); Iqbal and Sattar (2005) and Malik, et al. (2006) for these types of growth models in 
Pakistan. 
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Output growth is posited to be the function of a set of control variables. These 
control variables include an index capturing democracy, physical and human capital 
accumulations, government size, trade openness, domestic inflation and oil prices. 
Changes in any of these control variables would be expected to alter per capita output 
growth. 13  
 
5. DATA, ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
5.1. Overview of the Data 
This study employs annual time-series data for Pakistan for the period 1947 to 
2006.14 The determining factor behind the selection of theoretically relevant variables is 
the availability of data.  Non-availability of data restricted the use of some important 
growth determining variables (e.g. corruption, black market premium etc.). The 
dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth rate. Democracy is proxied by Polity2 
score, which is taken from Polity IV dataset described by Marshall and Jaggers. Polity2 is 
an index ranging from –10 (full autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). This index 
employs a 21-point scale and takes into account how the executive is selected, the degree 
of checks on executive power and the form of political competition. This indicator 
presents good historical coverage and allows us to consider both the degree and duration 
of democracy in any given country-year; so it is appropriate to use it in a time-series 
context.15 A complete description of variables along with data sources is given in 
Appendix A.  
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the main variables used in this study, 
which may help in the interpretation of the coefficient estimates by providing the scale of 
the relevant variables. Column (1) of Table 2 correlates output growth with all 
independent variables. The value of correlation coefficient –0.10 indicates that output 
growth is slightly negatively correlated with the democracy index. Output growth is also 
negatively correlated with oil prices. In turn, growth is positively correlated with physical 
capital stock, human capital, government consumption, trade openness and domestic 
inflation. Column (2) contains the correlations between the democracy index and all other 
independent variables. The  democracy index is positively correlated with all independent 
variables with the possible exception of oil prices, which is negatively correlated with the 
democracy index. Since the democracy index is correlated with growth-determining 
variables, column (2) might help in exploring the channels through which democracy is 
expected to effect output growth.  
 
13See Barro (1991) and Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002), among others, for theoretically predicted signs 
of various independent variables on output growth.  
14In December 1971, East Pakistan became an independent political entity as Bangladesh. However, 
prior to 1971 certain statistics were published on aggregate basis. Our primary interest is in the democracy 
index, as it is not possible to disaggregate data on political grounds, therefore, we have used the published 
aggregate data. Also see Amjad (1982) in this regard. 
15Hereafter the word ‘democracy index’ will connote ‘Polity2 score’ unless otherwise indicated. 
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5.2.  Democracy-Growth Analysis 
Before estimating the growth equation, we have first checked the stationarity of 
the variables using ADF unit-root test. All variables, except per capita GDP growth and 
the democracy index, are found to be integrated of order one.16 It indicates that the 
estimated growth equation can form a long-run relationship of output growth with all 
explanatory variables except the democracy index; the latter has a short run relationship 
with output growth. To overcome endogeneity and omitted variable problems, the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique of Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano (1993), and Arellano and Bover (1995) has been applied to estimate 
output growth equation using lagged values of the variables as instruments. 
Table 3 reports the regression results. The results indicate that once all control 
variables are held constant, the marginal contribution of democracy to growth is slightly 
negative. The magnitude of the coefficient of democracy index is very small (–0.0023). This 
is due to the fact that the democracy index changes after a number of years (not after every 
year), thereby depicting a small impact on output growth in yearly time-series data. The 
coefficient estimate implies that, ceteris paribus, a one point increase in democracy index 
would decrease per capita output growth by 0.0023 points.17 Thus the results are consistent 
with the findings of some previous studies, which suggest a weak adverse influence of 
democracy on economic growth. Given that the coefficient of democracy is negative, we can 
interpret this to mean that as a government institutionalises democracy over time, economic 
growth in the country should decelerate. The estimated coefficient on the democracy index 
remains negative and statistically significant to changing variables in growth equation 
specifications. The model appears to perform well from a statistical point of view.  
As far as control variables are concerned, it is found that growth is enhanced by 
high physical and human capital accumulations. The statistical significance of human 
capital is greater than that of physical capital; it validates the endogenous (new growth) 
theory that human capital has a strong influence on growth performance. Moreover, 
government consumption expenditures, trade openness and domestic inflation positively 
contribute to growth. A possible justification for the positive effect of government 
consumption on growth is that, in Pakistan, the economic benefits of public goods of a 
larger government outweigh the cost of financing its activities through distortionary 
taxation. Similarly, high inflation rate, for instance, by increasing investment through 
reduced real interest rate, raises growth.  The favourable effect of trade openness on 
growth is also consistent with the extant literature.  In turn, an increase in oil prices 
distorts output growth; this result is also consistent with theoretical predictions. Overall, 
the explanatory variables account for about 54 percent variation in output growth. The 
autoregressive (AR) process has been applied to remove autocorrelation from the model. 
Values of Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics are reasonably close to the desired value of 
two, which indicates the absence of autocorrelation problem in the model.    
 
16To conserve space ADF test results are not reported here. However, results may be obtained from 
authors upon request.    
17To check the non-linear effect of democracy on output growth a quadratic term in democracy index 
was introduced in the growth regression. But its effect on growth turned out to be statistically insignificant and 
hence it is excluded from the estimation. Similarly, some other control variables were also incorporated in the 
growth regression. But due to their statistically insignificant effects on growth they are also excluded from the 
estimation. 
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5.3.  Sensitivity Analysis  
 
5.3.1. Sensitivity to Political Variables  
In this section, two alternative political variables, namely political constraint and 
democracy dummy, are used to gauge the effects of democracy on output growth. Political 
constraint is proxied by the POLCONV score, which is taken from POLCON data set 
described by Henisz. POLCONV is an index ranging from 0 (no constraints on executive’s 
powers) to 1 (full constraints on executive’s powers). The political constraint variable 
measures the degree of constraints on policy change using data on the number of 
independent veto points in the political system (executive, legislative, judicial and sub-
federal branches of government) and the distribution of political preferences both across 
and within these branches. High constraints on the powers of the executive denote high 
level of democracy. The democracy dummy takes the value of 1 when there is a democratic 
system in a given year and zero, otherwise. It is evident from Table 2 that all three measures 
of democracy—the democracy index, political constraint and democracy dummy—are 
highly correlated with each other. The correlation coefficient between the democracy index 
and political constraint is 0.76, while the correlation coefficient between the democracy 
index and democracy dummy is 0.89. Thus both political constraint and the democracy 
dummy can be taken as good proxies to measure democracy. 
Table 4 provides the regression results. The coefficients on political constraint and 
the democracy dummy bear significant negative signs. These results support the findings 
of the previous section that democracy in Pakistan hampers output growth. The 
magnitude of the coefficients of both political constraint (–0.0558) and democracy 
dummy (–0.0212) is greater than that of democracy index (–0.0023). The results suggest 
that, ceteris paribus, a one point increase in political constraint (democracy dummy) 
would decrease growth by 0.0558 (0.0212) points per year. The effect on growth of a one 
point change in political constraint (–0.0558) is relatively greater not only to the impact 
of a change in democracy dummy (–0.0212) but also to the impact of a change in the 
democracy index (–0.0023). The results of control variables are also in accordance with 
the findings of the previous section in that both physical and human capital 
accumulations, government consumption expenditures, trade openness and inflation 
positively contribute to growth while oil prices distort growth. 
 
5.3.2.  Sensitivity to the Inclusion of Interaction Terms  
The effect of the democracy index on growth may be considered as a ‘pure’ effect 
of democracy on growth, independent of the effect of democracy working through its 
impact on growth determining variables. However, in literature it is well determined that 
the established link between democracy and economic growth is a result of the 
connections between democracy and other determinants of growth, e.g. physical capital 
stock, human capital, government consumption, trade openness, etc. [Barro (1996); 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001); Kurzman, et al. (2002); Gerring, et al. (2005)]. To check 
the ‘indirect effects’ of democracy on growth via growth determining variables, different 
interaction terms have been included in the growth equation. Table 5 provides the 
regression results. In column (1) the coefficient of the interaction term ‘Democracy 
Index*Capital  Stock’ is  –0.0016.   It  shows   that  democracy  index  has  decreased  the  
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Table 4 
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Table 5 
 
 The GMM Estimates of the Relationship between Per Capita  
GDP Growth and Democracy Index [1947 to 2006] 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept 0.3461 0.4150 0.3985 0.4059 
 (2.9562)* (3.8464)* (2.8115)* (3.4399)* 
Democracy Index –0.0118 –0.0113 –0.0385 –0.0072 
 (–1.7139)** (–1.7645)** (–2.0432)* (–2.0893)* 
Capital Stock 0.0457 0.0373 0.0343 0.0515 
 (2.1166)* (1.8451)** (1.8301)** (2.9512)* 
Human Capital 0.0622 0.0599 0.0738 0.0609 
 (4.5864)* (4.3654)* (4.5580)* (5.1498)* 
Govt. Consumption 0.0225 0.0249 0.0117 0.0394 
 (2.0522)* (1.9821)** (0.6318) (3.1080)* 
Trade Openness 0.0412 0.0432 0.0272 0.0283 
 (2.3465)* (2.5611)* (1.9944)** (1.8554)** 
Inflation 0.1979 0.1858 0.0975 0.4495 
 (1.1115) (1.1229) (0.3463) (3.4585)* 
Oil Prices  –0.0013 –0.0037 –0.0229 –0.0057 
 (–0.2025) (–0.5913) (–1.5792) (–1.4110) 
Democracy Index*Capital Stock –0.0016    
 (–2.0960)*    
Democracy Index *Human Capital  –0.0017   
  (–2.1461)*   
Democracy Index*Govt. Consumption   –0.0051  
   (–1.9316)**  
Democracy Index*Trade Openness     –0.0038 
    (–1.8010)** 
AR(1) –0.5429 –0.4758 –0.4297 –0.4071 
 (–6.4828)* (–5.8378)* (–3.9730)* (–4.2589)* 
R2 0.5834 0.5569 0.5320 0.5321 
Adjusted R2 0.5536 0.5327 0.5166 0.5139 
DW 1.9891 2.0938 2.1425 2.1126 
Note: Values in parentheses denote underlying student-t values. The t statistics significant at 5  percent and 10  
percent levels of significance are indicated by * and ** respectively. 
 
coefficient of capital stock by –0.0016 percentage points. In other words, it means that as 
the level of democracy increases, an increase in capital stock will decrease output growth 
by -0.0016 percentage points per year. Similarly, column (2) suggests that as the level of 
democracy increases, an increase in the level of human capital will decrease growth by   
–0.0017 percentage points per year. A similar interpretation holds for columns (3) and (4) 
in which democracy hinders growth via influencing government consumption 
expenditures and the country’s commercial policy respectively. Thus our results are 
broadly in line with the findings of previous studies in that democracy hinders economic 
growth by influencing growth determining variables. However, the inclusion of 
interaction terms has led inflation and oil prices variables to become statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, the significant level of the democracy index has also decreased. 
Thus the results of Table 5 should be taken with caution.  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper empirically examines the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth in Pakistan using annual time-series data for the period 1947 to 2006. 
The paper identifies three areas for methodological improvement in political economy of 
growth. First, instead of a dichotomous variable, a near-continuous measure of 
democracy is used. Second, rather than using static indicators employed in cross-
sectional studies, this paper employs time-series data that account for the rise and fall of 
democracy during the period under study. Third, indirect effects of democracy on growth 
are also identified. Using standard econometric methodology, the empirical results reveal 
that, ceteris paribus, democracy has slightly negative effects on economic growth in 
Pakistan. This link between democracy and economic growth is robust to sensitivity 
checks, which include changing democracy variables and growth equation specifications. 
Democracy is also found to impair economic growth indirectly by influencing physical 
capital stock, human capital, government consumption expenditures and trade openness. 
As far as control variables are concerned, growth is positively related to capital stock per 
worker, human capital, large government size, trade openness and inflation, while it is 
negatively related to increased oil prices.  
Pakistan remained under military rule for most of the time, which discouraged the 
proliferation of conditions required for the existence of democracy. As a result, 
inefficient democratic governments have halted economic growth in Pakistan. This 
highlights the need to establish political institutions and policies to promote strong 
democracies in Pakistan. Thus it will take time for Pakistan to become a fully democratic 
state to reap the benefits of democracy. In fact, this notion indirectly supports the 
‘conflict view’ that democracy improves growth only when a sustainable level of 
development has been achieved. Since Pakistan is a developing country, it will take time 
for Pakistan to achieve a threshold level of development required for the existence of 
democracy. Moreover, independent thinking and discussion is the way to develop 
democractic setup in Pakistan. Political scientists and analysts have to play their role in 
this process of public thinking and discussion. In the process of doing so a nation-wide 
consensus should be evolved, which could form the basis of a concerted effort to find a 
solution for one of the most burning problems of Pakistan.  
Although these results may extend the political economy of development 
literature in Pakistan in a useful way, it is important to highlight the limitations of 
this type of empirical work. For example, democracy indexes are subjective measures 
that are likely to capture other relevant determinants of economic growth other than 
political institutions only and the data used to construct democracy indices is not free 
of errors. Moreover, democracy has its greatest effect in the short term, while 
economic growth is better understood in longer terms. It is also difficult to control 
for all relevant characteristics of a country. In fact, time-series analysis, as 
undertaken in this paper, can settle the dispute of democracy’s effect on economic 
growth as the ‘conflict view’ has been supported by the findings of the paper. 
Democracy appears to have complex multiple effects on growth that need to be 
further explored as new variables become available in the time-series format and new 
estimation procedures are developed for this work.   
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Given the fact that developing the main ingredients for democracy, namely a 
democratically minded people, who have free minds, are well educated and can 
consciously and fully participate in a democratic set-up, will take time, independent 
thinking and discussion is the way to develop and define such an interim set up. Political 
scientists and analysts have to play their role in this process of public thinking and 
discussion. In the process of doing so a nation-wide consensus should be evolved, which 
could form the basis of a concerted effort to find a solution for one of the most burning 
problems of Pakistan. 
In view of the internal pressure for quick implementation of democracy and 
making adherence to democracy a decisive criterion by the West for advancing loans or 
development aid, the allocation of development funds and of other means of economic 
aid and cooperation, the incentives for ‘going democractic’ have risen considerably in 
Pakistan. 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND DATA SOURCES 
Output Growth )( tY : Dependent variable used in growth equation is real per capita 
GDP growth rate. The data is collected from Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 
(various issues) and International Financial Corporation, International Financial 
Statistics (various issues). 
Democracy )( tDMC : Democracy is proxied by Polity2 score, which is taken from 
Polity IV dataset described by Marshall and Jaggers. Polity2 is an index ranging from     
–10 (full autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). The second measure of democracy 
that is political constraint is proxied by POLCONV score, which is taken from POLCON 
dataset described by Henisz. POLCONV is an index ranging from 0 (no constraints on 
executive’s powers) to 1 (full constraints on executive’s powers). The third variable of 
democracy that is democracy dummy takes the value of 1 when there is democratic 
system in a given year and zero otherwise. 
Capital Stock per Worker )( tk : Capital stock per worker is defined as the ratio of 
capital stock to labour force. Data is taken from Government of Pakistan, Economic 
Survey (various issues) and International Financial Corporation, International Financial 
Statistics (various issues). 
Human Capital )( thc : It is proxied by total secondary school enrolment (regardless 
of age and gender). Data source is World Bank, World Development Indicators, and 
Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey (various issues). 
Government Consumption )( tg : It is proxied as the ratio of real government 
consumption (net of education and defense expenditures) to real GDP, and the data is 
obtained from Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey (various issues) and 
International Financial Corporation, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
Trade Openness )( topen : This variable is defined as the ratio of total trade to nominal 
GDP. Data is taken from Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey (various issues) and 
International Financial Corporation, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
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Inflation )( tINF : Domestic inflation rate is calculated as the growth rate of 
consumer price index (CPI), and the data is taken from Government of Pakistan, 
Economic Survey (various issues) and International Financial Corporation, International 
Financial Statistics (various issues). 
Oil Prices )( toil : Data on world oil prices is taken from International Financial 
Corporation, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
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Table 1 
 
 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Regressions  
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. No. of Obs. 
Per Capita Output Growth 0.03 0.02 0.64 –0.07 0.09 59 
Democracy Index 0.63 1.00 8.00 –7.00 5.97 60 
Political Constraint 0.20 0.22 0.76 0.00 0.23 59 
Democracy Dummy  0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 60 
Capital Stock (ln) 7.70 7.87 9.29 5.38 1.08 60 
Human Capital (ln) 7.42 7.51 9.00 5.65 0.99 60 
Govt. Consumption (% of Real GDP)  0.04 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01 60 
Trade Openness (% of Nominal GDP)  26.70 28.68 37.95 10.24 6.63 59 
Inflation 0.06 0.05 0.24 –0.04 0.05 59 
Oil Prices (ln) 2.00 2.49 3.94 0.58 1.26 60 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 Correlation Table for Variables Included in Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Per Capita Output Growth 1.00          
Democracy Index –0.10 1.00         
Political Constraint –0.09 0.76 1.00        
Democracy Dummy  –0.04 0.89 0.55 1.00       
Capital Stock (ln) 0.31 0.10 0.07 0.25 1.00      
Human Capital (ln) 0.25 0.17 0.07 0.33 0.98 1.00     
Govt. Consumption (Ratio of Real GDP) 
(ln) 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.71 0.66 1.00    
Trade Openness (Ratio of Nominal GDP) 
(ln) 0.26 0.16 0.09 0.43 0.68 0.65 0.38 1.00   
Inflation 0.15 0.52 0.25 0.62 0.09 0.20 –0.22 0.45 1.00  
Oil Prices (ln) –0.16 –0.10 –0.22 0.17 0.84 0.83 0.41 0.78 0.29 1.00 
 
Table 3 
 
 The GMM Estimates of the Relationship between Per Capita GDP  
Growth and Democracy Index (1947 to 2006) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept  0.3961 0.0721 0.1761 0.0243 –0.0410 0.1044 –0.1853 –0.0386 0.0062 0.0494 
 (4.1499)*  (13.5614)* (10.9309)* (2.8149)* (–2.8557)* (2.9534)* (–2.5509)* (–2.3669)* (1.0672) (5.4845)* 
Democracy Index –0.0023 –0.0003 –0.0015 –0.0021 –0.0018 –0.0012 –0.0011 –0.0009 –0.0016 –0.0007 
 (–3.9878)*  (–3.1971)* (–6.8629)* (–2.6094)* (–3.5863)* (–2.4799)* (–2.1359)* (–2.0855)* (–3.1626)* (–2.1957)* 
Capital Stock  0.0456 0.0202   0.0076      
 (3.0158)*  (7.5536)*   (3.9478)*      
Human Capital  0.0581 0.0273    0.0102     
 (5.2114)*  (11.2773)*    (2.2466)*     
Govt. Consumption  0.0320  0.0141    0.0264    
 (2.7813)*   (7.5485)*    (2.9222)*    
Trade Openness  0.0409  0.0331     0.0498   
 (2.7982)*   (4.0898)*     (3.8189)*   
Inflation  0.3616   0.2205     0.1852  
 (3.1294)*    (2.5320)*     (3.2449)*  
Oil Prices   –0.0055   –0.0068      –0.0085 
 (–1.7105)**   (–2.2510)*      (–2.8966)* 
AR (1) –0.3597          
 (–4.0219)*           
R2 0.5447 0.2419 0.2306 0.2795 0.2282 0.2287 0.2492 0.2393 0.2528 0.2142 
Adjusted R2 0.5103 0.2111 0.2170 0.2531 0.1871 0.1989 0.2147 0.1816 0.2207 0.1807 
DW 2.0445 1.8747 2.1278 2.0799 2.1105 2.0252 2.0371 1.8999 2.0238 2.1031 
Note: Values in parentheses denote underlying student-t values. The t-statistics significant at 5  percent and 10  percent levels of significance are indicated by * and ** respectively.  
Table 4 
The GMM Estimates of the Relationship Between Per Capita GDP Growth and Political Constraint/Democracy Dummy [1947 to 2006] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Political Constraint  Democracy Dummy  
Intercept 0.1127 0.0116 –0.0330 0.0014 0.3687 0.1355 0.1762 0.0325 
 (0.9028) (0.3710) (–0.8501) (0.2115) (3.8260)* (6.3917)* (10.8586)* (3.4366)* 
Political Constraint –0.0558 –0.0264 –0.0236 –0.0273     
 (–4.2697)* (–2.7893)* (–4.1802)* (–3.3809)*     
Democracy Dummy      –0.0212 –0.0212 –0.0142 –0.0451 
     (–3.9466)* (–3.6277)* (–5.1525)* (–5.3930)* 
Capital Stock 0.0512 0.0591   0.0216 0.0376   
 (2.7664)* (2.5206)*   (1.7592)** (2.8191)*   
Human Capital 0.0511 0.0597   0.0379 0.0260   
 (4.8675)* (2.6415)*   (4.3388)* (1.8132)**   
Govt. Consumption 0.0068  0.0130  0.0205  0.0143  
 (0.7858)  (2.3533)*  (2.2665)*  (7.2422)*  
Trade Openness 0.0299  0.0353  0.0567  0.0265  
 (2.5004)*  (3.7008)*  (4.4129)*  (3.9273)*  
Inflation 0.1769   0.1393 0.2198   0.3166 
 (2.5766)*   (3.5572)* (2.7506)*   (4.5859)* 
Oil Prices  –0.0076   –0.0055 –0.0001   –0.0060 
 (–1.3439)   (–3.0121)* (–0.0481)   (–2.7254)* 
AR (1) –0.5790    –0.3798    
 (–5.6940)*    (–4.6847)*    
R2 0.4978 0.2666 0.2580 0.2361 0.5301 0.2381 0.2069 0.1962 
Adjusted R2 0.4537 0.2415 0.2459 0.2132 0.4927 0.2186 0.1848 0.1772 
DW 2.1140 2.1257 2.1506 2.1345 2.1447 1.8798 2.1696 1.9322 
Note: Values in parentheses denote underlying student-t values. The t statistics significant at 5 percent and 10 percent levels of significance are indicated by * and ** respectively. 
 
